For more than 15 years, the Institute of Social Psychology at the University of Hamburg runs its own series of working papers which are produced for discussion purposes only. These works will normally be published in a revised form subsequently. The authors should thus be contacted before referring to its contents in other published works. In a first rating procedure, statements containing justifications of politically motivated violence will be identified based upon argumentation analysis. The selected statements will then be rated in a second process in regard to the underlying ethics. The justification patterns will be presented, compared, and discussed in respect to the interaction of culture and type of aggression.
Introduction
For more than 2000 years, philosophers have tried to determine circumstances that may justify war and other acts of aggression from a moral point of view. Political frameworks such as the "Just War theory" aim at establishing specific principles that are meant to evaluate whether military action is permissible (Christopher, 1999; Regan, 1996; Walzer, 1977) . The traditional theory of just war comprises two sets of principles, one determining the resort of war (jus ad bellum), and the other regulating the conduct of war (jus in bello). It demands that just aims be established before conducting military operations, that severe violence should be used as a last resort and that reasonable proportionality in regard to violence be maintained (McMahan, 2004) . Furthermore, it distinguishes between combatants and non-combatants, discriminating somehow between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' targets. In this respect, Just War theory has also been applied in order to conclude that terrorist acts are not justifiable in a moral sense (Coady, 2004; Smilansky, 2004) .
In the field of Psychology, we are interested in how people actually argue when justifying acts of violence, shifting the focus from a normative perspective to a rather descriptive approach that tries to examine the underlying ethical positions. This approach is based on the assumption that moralities are "relative to particular contexts or frameworks, which people choose to accept or reject" (Calhoun, 2001, p. 42) . As a consequence, justifications are expected to vary according to different standards of right and wrong. Hence, the question in focus is not whether politically motivated acts of aggression are justifiable in an absolute sense, but rather to explore similarities and differences within the ethical positions of various groups engaging in politically motivated violence.
The aim of this study is to examine patterns of ethical argumentations that are meant to justify acts of war and terrorism. The term "terrorism" is often referred to as "intentionally targeting noncombatants with lethal or severe violence for political purposes" (Coady, 2001 (Coady, , p.1697 , while war has been defined as an "actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities" (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005) . Both war and terror exist in a variety of forms and for various historical, sociological, and psychological reasons. In this respect, most definitions tend to oversimplify the phenomena. Nonetheless, it can be stated that both war and terror consist of politically motivated acts of severe violence. While acts of war are usually a condition of an "open and declared, hostile armed conflict between states or nations" (Webster's Dictionary), acts of terror constitute rather unpredictable acts of aggression towards civilians.
For both types of aggression, justifications have reached the public through press conferences, press releases or video broadcasts. Justifications are defined as a positive evaluation of an action for which the subject is responsible (Klein, 1987) . More specifically, it can be stated that justifications are given when the actors anticipate negative evaluation of their action or even acknowledge that their actions are somehow illegitimate (Keller & Edelstein, 1991) . The justification itself consists of giving reasons that are meant to outweigh the violations in question (Keller, 1984) . Overall, the committed action is evaluated positively by the actor. This feature discriminates justifications from excuses and apologies where the activity in question is acknowledged to be rather negative (Rehbein, 1972) . Kienpointner (1992) points out that, in daily argumentation, normative reasoning does not follow strict logical rules as postulated by philosophers. He distinguishes between seven schemes of daily normative argumentation, such as schemes of comparing, contrasting, referring to authorities, arguing in causalities, etc. These schemes of justifications can also be found in public explanations given by leaders of political parties and terrorist organizations.
The study at hand focuses on the analysis of the underlying ethical principles of these justification patterns. It relies on the prescriptive attribution model as proposed by Witte & Doll (1995) . In contrast to attribution theories that describe how people explain the causes of behavior on a factual level (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Jones & Harris, 1967; Weiner, 1985) , prescriptive attribution theory examines the reasons people give for their actions on the value level. The prescriptive attribution model draws on the widely-known differentiation between means-oriented and ends-oriented ethics, focusing either on the duties upon which we base our behavior or rather stressing the consequences of our action. Besides these two sets of moral coordinates, ethics differ with respect to the extent of the moral community (Harman & Thomson, 1996) . Some are restricted to the individual perspective, some include all people of a certain group, such as people from a specific nation or a religious group, and others include all humans of whatever nationality or religion. The original model of prescriptive attribution differentiates between two levels of judgement, focusing either on the individual or on society in general. In order to apply the model to the field of politics, a third level, the group-specific level of judgement has been added ( The fundamental assumption of deontological ethics is that decisions should be derived from general principles that are regarded as universally valid. It holds that morality is an intrinsic feature of human action, determined by moral obligations without referring to the consequences that the action may have (Kant, 1797) . Utilitarianism, in contrast, is based on the maxim of achieving the utmost good for the majority. It was originally proposed by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and forms one of the major theories of consequentialism.
From a utilitarian perspective, moral action demands that a certain good be maximized for the majority, while deontologists regard an action as fulfilling moral standards when it follows norms and values seen as universally valid. Particulate deontology differs from the latter perspective in so far as it originates from group-specific obligations, rights and virtues. Particulate utilitarianism, on the contrary, aims at the greatest outcome for a specific group of people. Intuitionism considers the reason for an action to stem from individual and immediate judgment as to what ought to be done (Sidgwick, 1874) . It postulates that we have the power of seeing clearly what actions are right and reasonable. Typically, these sorts of justifications are not supported by further reasoning.
Finally, the hedonistic view focuses on increasing well-being and reducing pain for the individual. By stating that no action may harm an individual, hedonism goes far beyond egoism and constitutes the fundamental basis for an ethical norm. The prescriptive attribution model has been empirically confirmed in a number of different studies (Gollenia, 1999; Hackel, 1995 (Witte & Doll, 1995; Witte, 2002 "And by the will of God Almighty, we will soon see the fall of the unbelievers' states, at whose forefront is America, the tyrant, which has destroyed all human values and transgressed all limits." 16 
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Forsyth and colleagues (Forsyth, 1980; Forsyth & Nye, 1990; Forsyth & Pope, 1984) found similar ethical positions. Representing the perspective of personality psychology, they define the theoretical background of positions in a slightly different way and use a taxonomy based on the scales of relativism and idealism. In so far, their approach of examining ethical positions differs from the one presented here.
It is essential that "different ethical judgments do not imply different ethical frameworks and similar ethical judgments do not imply similar ethical frameworks" (Hunt & Vitell, 1986, p. 14) . Ethical positions have been found empirically in different contexts.
The importance of each ethical principle varies with culture (Maeng, 1995) , with the quality of the actions that have to be justified (individual, interpersonal, and social actions) (Witte & Doll, 1995) , with social identity (Gollenia, 1999) , social roles (Witte & Heitkamp, 2005) , and with professional socialization (Hackel, 1995) .
The study at hand will present the ethical justification patterns of war and terror that occur within the speeches of the four groups examined. In a second step, four hypotheses will be tested inference-statistically. The first two hypotheses claim that (1) there is no significant difference between the justifications of war and the justifications of terrorism in respect to the underlying ethical positions, and that (2) there is no significant difference in the patterns of ethical justifications between the two cultures regarded in this study. Based on previous findings on newsletter articles discussing ethical topics (Witte & Doll, 1995) , it will be hypothesized that in the public justifications of war and terror (3) Utilitarian argumentation patterns (U, U-, PU, and PU-) will be the prevalent ethical justifications across groups. Finally, the fourth hypothesis holds that (4) the particulate ethical positions (PU, PU-, PD, and PD-) will be the predominant justification patterns in all four cases examined. The final hypothesis relies on studies on social identity (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987) and draws on related mechanisms such as the "ingroup favoritism" (Messick & Mackie, 1989) and concurrent attribution processes concerning the "outgroup" (Perdue et al., 1990) that are hypothesized to foster the group-specific level of judgment.
In a third step, further differences between the single groups will be explored through pair-wise testing. Finally, it will be examined whether the occurrence of each single justification pattern is influenced by the type of violence or by the cultural factor.
Method
Sample. In order to contribute to the current political situation, examples of war and terror from both Western as well as Arabian parties and terrorist organizations were chosen. The four resulting combinations of the features "War and Terror" and "Western and Arabian countries" were exemplified by selected speeches and explanations from (1) the American Government justifying the military strikes in Afghanistan (2001-) and the war in Iraq (2003-) (2) (Hussein, 1981) . The explanations given by al-Qaeda consist of five speeches taken out of a volume of statements by Osama Bin Laden that were translated into English language (Lawrence, 2005) .
Procedure. Two rating procedures were conducted. The first rating process aimed at identifying statements containing a justification, defined as a positive evaluation of an action for which the subject is responsible (Klein, 1987) . The procedure was based on argumentation analysis, selecting statements falling under one of the seven categories of normative argumentation as outlined by Kienpointner (1992) . Out of 1,728 sentences, 1,035 were identified by two independent raters as containing justifications of war or terror (κ = .571). The selected statements were then rated in a second process in regard to the underlying ethics, based on operationalizations proposed by Witte & Doll (1995) . In total, N = 1,253 ethical positions were revealed and categorized (N USA = 479, N RAF = 125, N Iraq = 217, N al-Qaeda = 432). The number of ethical principles exceeded the number of selected sentences, as 249 statements contained more than one ethical principle. The second rating procedure was conducted by three independent raters who were trained for this purpose. With respect to the rather complex material, the rating consistency can be regarded as satisfactory (κ = .537) (Wirtz & Caspar, 2002, p. 59) . A non-parametric χ²-test revealed different marginal distributions for the ethical justification patterns (χ² (df =11) = 76,065 > χ² crit, df=11, α=.05 = 19,68 at p < .001). Thus, kappa might be partially influenced by the different baselines.
Results
The results show significant differences in the justification patterns between the four groups. The ethical basis of justifying the "War on Terrorism" constitutes a rather wide range of frequently used arguments (figure 1). While all twelve ethical positions were found in public explanations given by the White House, direct hedonistic arguments (H) could not be identified within the statements made by the Red Army Faction (figure 2).
Indirect hedonistic arguments (H-), however, constitute 4.8 % of the justifications given by the RAF, indicating that the adversary is seen to be lacking hedonistic values. The indirect-particulate utilitarianism (PU-), emphasizing the negative consequences of the enemy's action for a certain group, represents the most frequent form of ethical argumentation within the justification pattern of the Red Army Faction (27.2 %). Taking a look at the levels of judgement, it is not surprising that the individual-oriented ethics are underrepresented in the justification of politically motivated acts (6.9 % ). In total, the groups engaged more likely in group-specific argumentations (50.1 % ) than in ethical judgements with a universally valid perspective (43.0 %).
Testing of Hypotheses
Since χ²-testing of the hypotheses requires an expected cell frequency of 5, the individual level of judgement cannot be considered in the inference-statistical analysis.
The relative frequency of the eight remaining types of argumentation will therefore be recalculated.
The first hypothesis claims that there is no significant difference between the justifications of war and the justifications of terrorism in respect to the underlying ethical positions. To test upon differences between the two groups, an omnibus χ²-test is conducted. It leads to a χ²-value of 70,639 (df = 7, p < .001), showing that there has to be a significant difference in the justification patterns between the two sorts of aggression. In order to determine which ethical positions account for these differences, pair-wise χ²-tests are conducted. Due to multiple testing, the α-level has to be adjusted.
Von Eye (1990) recommends controlling the alpha level by using the Bonferroni adjustment, determining the level of significance by the number of r simultaneous tests with α* = α/r. Conducting r = 8 simultaneous tests leads to α* = .006 that is analogous to a significance level of α = .05. Table 4 shows that the two forms of aggression differ in two aspects. While utilitarianism occurs more often within justifications of war (10.1 %), terrorist groups seem to engage rarely in utilitarian argumentation (2.0 %) (χ² = 31,058 p < .001).
Instead, negative deontology is predominant in terror justifications (17.6 %) while it has only been found in 7.5 % of the justifications of war (χ² = 28,063 p < .001). In order to interpret the size of proportional differences, Cohen (1977) suggests standardizing the They imply that negative deontology occurs more often in Arabian countries (14.6 %) than in Western countries (9.0 %), going along with the particulate specification (PD-), which is highlighted in 23.8 % of the justifications given by the Arabian group. Particulate utilitarianism, instead, stressing the positive consequences of one's action for the own group or an affiliated population, seems to be utilized more often in the West (7.0 %) than in Arabian countries (3.1 %), whereas the negative expression of particulate utilitarianism, emphasizing on the bad consequences of the enemy's action for a certain group is underlined more frequently by the Arabian group (22.1 % vs. 14.6 %). The largest effect sizes occur on the utilitarian dimension. While both the direct and the indirect utilitarian argumentations can be found in 11.3 % respectively 14.7 % of the justifications given by the Western groups, they represent only a small proportion of the justifications given by the Arabian countries (2.1 % respectively 3.4 %).
The third hypothesis holds that justifications containing utilitarian patterns of argumentation are predominant in public justifications of violent acts. In order to test this hypothesis, particular and universal utilitarian argumentations are combined and contrasted with the frequency of the combined deontological ethics. Table 6 shows the proportional distribution of justifications comprehending deontological (61.1 %) and utilitarian (39.9 %) reasoning. Since the rate of utilitarian versus deontological arguments adds up to 1:1.6, the hypothesis cannot be held true. Taking a look at the single groups, the data show that the Red Army Faction is the only one stressing utilitarian aspects. A one-dimensional χ²-test reveals, though, that the difference between utilitarian and deontological argumentation is not significant within the German terror organization (χ² = 0,561, p = .454). The fourth hypothesis states that group-specific justifications are dominant within all public justifications of aggressive acts. Table 7 displays the proportional distribution of particulate and universal ethics. It indicates that justifications originating from a groupspecific perspective occur slightly more often (53.9 %) than ethics with a universal perspective (46.1 %). A one-dimensional χ²-tests confirms this difference being significant (χ² = 6,947, df = 1, p = .008). However, the proportional difference of 7.8 % constitutes a rather small effect size of h = .16 and can be only interpreted as a tendency. So far, the examination of the hypotheses revealed that (1) the justifications of war and terrorism differ substantially in regard to two ethical positions (2) the justifications within the Western and Arabian countries examined in this study vary significantly in respect to six ethical argumentation patterns (3) the percentage of deontological justifications is, in contrast to utilitarian ethics, unexpectedly high within public justifications of aggressive acts, and (4) particulate justifications emphasizing group-specific aspects are slightly dominant across groups.
Exploration of further Differences between the Groups
In a third step, further differences in the argumentation patterns will be explored. Von Eye (1990) proposes a two-step procedure in order to explore different frequencies of configurations between independent groups. The first step consists of χ²-tests across all groups for each configuration. Should such a test reveal statistical significances, pairwise asymptotic hypergeometrical tests between the groups will indicate group-specific types of argumentation. As outlined earlier, the alpha-level needs adapting due to multiple testing (α* = .006). Table 8 The Comparison of the justifications given by the U.S. and the former Iraqi government reveals four significant discrepancies. The most striking difference lies within the use of indirect utilitarianism (h = .595). While the North-American government justifies the war against terror by stressing the terrifying impact of terrorist acts for mankind (14.9 %), the former Iraqi government engages in indirect utilitarianism in only 1.4 % of the statements (p < .001). A similar effect can be found on direct utilitarianism (13.1 % vs. 3.8 %, p <.001, h = .335). The Iraqi Government, instead, emphasizes more frequently on the enemy not fulfilling his responsibilities (PD-, 30.5 %) and on the resulting negative consequences for the Iraqi people (PU-, 29.1 %), while the U.S. government applies PDin 12 % and PU-in 10.6 % of the explanations (p < .001).
Five significant differences lie between the U.S. American justifications and the explanations given by al-Qaeda. Four differences are similar to the ones between the U.S. and the Iraqi government. In contrast to the U.S. government, members of al-Qaeda tend not to justify their acts with utilitarian arguments, be it in a direct (1.3 % vs.
13.1 %, p < .001, h = .538) or indirect manner (4.5 % vs. 14.9 %, p < .001, h = .344).
Instead, they rather focus on negative-particularistic aspects on the utilitarian dimension Four differences of rather small effect size can be observed between the former Iraqi government and explanations given by al-Qaeda. The biggest difference lies within deontology, which is used more frequently by al-Qaeda, be it in a direct (23.7 % vs. 11.7 %, p < .001, h = .317) or in an indirect manner (17.9 % vs. 8.5 %, p = .267, h = .267).
The former Iraqi government, instead, engages more often in negative-particulate utilitarianism (29.1 % vs. 18.4 %, p = .003, h = .261) and negative-particulate deontology (30.5 % vs. 20.2 %, p = .005, h = .237) .
Interaction Patterns of Culture and Violence
In a final step, the underlying interaction patterns of culture and violence will be determined for each ethical position. The magnitude of influence will be indicated by effect sizes for proportions (Cohen, 1977) , with h = .20 referring to small effects and h = .50 implying medium effect sizes. With a sample size of N = 1166, effect sizes of h > .088 can be regarded as significant differences (*) between two proportions. Highly significant differences (**) are accounted for by h > .115. In the following section, only effect sizes reaching h ≥ .30 will be presented.
Tables 10 -13 display the distribution of each ethical position within the four groups. In addition, the prevalence within the two cultures and the two types of aggression is indicated in italics, while the total prevalence across all groups is printed in bold characters.
Utilitarianism. Table 10 shows an interesting interaction pattern between culture and aggression. While utilitarian arguments have been prevalent within Western explanations (h = .392), it can also be stated that utilitarian patterns occur significantly more often within justifications of war than within justifications of terror (h = .360). Thus, acts of war seem to be justified more likely with achieving the utmost good for the majority. 13,1 % 3,8 % 10,07 % (n = 66) Total ( Negative Utilitarianism. On the negative dimension, the use of utilitarian aspects seems to be rather influenced by cultural effects (table 11) . The Western groups examined in this study employed negative utilitarian aspects significantly more often than the Arabian parties (h = .392). vs. h = .026 (n.s.)). This result implies that Arabian groups emphasize on the opponent's violation of specific duties more frequently than Western groups do. 16, 7 % 17, 9 % 17, 61 % (n = 90) War 7, 0 % 8, 5 % 7, 48 % (n = 49) Total ( Taking a look at the similarities and differences between the groups, it can be stated that only a few, namely two differences become manifest between the U.S. and the Red Army Faction, the Red Army Faction and al-Qaeda, and the Red Army Faction and the former Iraqi government. Four differences have been observed between the U.S. and the Iraq, and Iraq and al-Qaeda. A clear difference appears between the U.S.
and al-Qaeda, originating from five significant deviances. This is a striking result, since the U.S. government and al-Qaeda are direct opponents. While the U.S. demonstrates utilitarian thinking, stressing the utmost good for mankind in regard to her actions, alQaeda very rarely engages in this sort of argumentation. Instead, the group outlines the negative impact of the enemy's action for the Muslim population. Furthermore, they regard the adversary's actions to be not in accordance with group-specific duties, but violating norms and values seen as universally valid. While both regard it as their duty to undertake action against the other, the U.S. takes the standpoint of acting in favor of humanity and fulfilling the country's role as a world power, whereas al-Qaeda justifies the committed acts with making a stand against immoral acts of the West and compensating for the suffering of the Muslim population.
With respect to the influence of aggression on ethical argumentation, two major results were obtained. While war is justified by focusing on the best outcome for the majority, terror intends to fend off external values that are somehow detested and not seen as universally valid. In terms of cultural influences, it can be stated that Western countries tend to utilize general utilitarian argumentations stressing that an action must focus on the utmost good for the majority, while Arabian countries underline negativeparticulate aspects on the deontological dimension, pointing at the constant threat for their population that is due to the enemy's violation of specific duties.
The excessive use of indirect justifications displays the perceived need to proceed against specific outgroups. Only the U.S. diverges from this pattern, showing less concern for external influence, but rather pursuing its own values. This, again, could reflect their superior position of holding global power. cognition and moral action merit examination (Blasi, 1980) .
The study revealed that there are significant differences between the groups with respect to the emphasis given to ethical principles. On the contrary, it illustrated that all general and particular justification patterns were employed across the groups. 
